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Six Years or Seven? An Apples-to-Apples Look at the Cliff Lee Sweepstakes

December 8, 2010 by William Juliano

The Cliff Lee sweepstakes has turned into a guessing game over which mystery teams have supposedly offered the ace lefthander a seven-year contract. Although no confirmations have been forthcoming, the addition of a seventh year seems to be a major sticking point, at least for the Yankees, who, again according to unsubstantiated rumors, are unwilling to go beyond six.

On his Twitter account, columnist John Heyman reported that although the Yankees intend on sticking to six years, they would try to “steal” Lee with an inflated offer of $140-150 million. Aside from the fact that a thief isn’t supposed to come away lighter in the pockets, the biggest problem with Heyman’s exclusive is the Yankees’ supposed logic doesn’t really make much economic sense (or cents, for that matter).

All long-term contracts carry heightened risk because of the increased uncertainty that comes from peering too far into the future. For many, the burden of carrying a star player past his prime at an inflated salary seems like a fate worse than being a fan of the Pittsburgh Pirates. However, we can sometimes get too carried away with the length of a contract, especially when what we should be focusing upon is the overall value.

Back loading a contract is one way teams seek to defray the exorbitant cost of long-term deals. Even though that goes completely against the misplaced logic summarized above (now, the star player is paid even more as he gets further from his prime), the economic reasoning is very sound. Why? Because money has time value. In other words, $1 in the present is not the same as $1 in the future ($1 in the present is usually worth more). Factors such as inflation, interest and tax rates can all have an impact on the value of money as time passes, which, brings us back to the Yankees’ reported aversion to giving Lee a seven-year deal.

Let’s assume that Heyman is correct and the Yankees are willing to pay Lee $150 million over the next six years. Instead of dismissing the notion of a seven-year deal out of hand, our next question should be at what terms would such a contract be equivalent? One way to determine that is to consider the present value of two different contracts and see how they compare.

Present Value Comparison of Two Contracts

  Deal 1: $150mn / 6 years   Deal 2: $164.5mn / 7 years
Year Salary Present Value   Salary Present Value
1 $25,000,000 $25,000,000   23,500,000 $23,500,000
2 $25,000,000 $22,186,231   23,500,000 $20,855,057
3 $25,000,000 $19,689,153   23,500,000 $18,507,804
4 $25,000,000 $17,473,124   23,500,000 $16,424,736
5 $25,000,000 $15,506,510   23,500,000 $14,576,120
6 $25,000,000 $13,761,240   23,500,000 $12,935,566
7 NA NA   23,500,000 $11,479,658
Total $150,000,000 $113,616,258   $164,500,000 $118,278,941

Note: Based on a nominal interest rate of 12% compounded monthly. Assumes salary paid in full each year (which favors shorter-term deal).

Source: zenwealth.com

At this point, it might be worthwhile to take a quick diversion and explain what present value means. Basically, in this instance, it refers to the amount of money the Yankees need today to pay off a debt tomorrow (think about Wimpy and hamburgers). Of course, the concept assumes that the money is invested wisely, not spent frivolously (think Carl Pavano). With that in mind, let’s assume the Yankees invested $22,186, 231 on day one of the rumored contract and received a 12% annual rate compounded monthly. At the end of the year, the Yankees initial investment would amount to $25,000,000 (principal plus interest of just over $2.8 million). As a result, with a discounted initial sum, the Yankees could pay Cliff Lee’s salary in the following season.

Now, let’s fast forward back to the comparison. Although it does look as if the Yankees’ shorter deal is less expensive, we aren’t finished yet. In addition to calculating the present value of each term year, we also need to consider the opportunity value of the $1.5 million “saved” under the longer contract. Once again, assuming that the Yankees invested the saving (125,000 per month) at an annual rate of 12%, they would end up with just over $4 million in return. When subtracted from the present value of the deal, the two terms presented in the chart above become near equivalent. For the Yankees, however, there is also the issue of luxury tax. Assuming the team’s payroll would hover around the same level regardless of either deal, it would enjoy a luxury tax savings of $3.6 million (or more, if the Yankees also invested that sum) over the first six years of the seven-year deal. When these factors are also considered, the seven-year deal comes in almost $3 million cheaper than the shorter version.

Normalization of Hypothetical Seven-Year Deal

Variables Total
Present Value $118,278,941
Interest on Lower AAS* $4,088,741
Luxury Tax Savings# $3,600,000
Final Cost $110,590,200

* Based on a nominal interest rate of 12% compounded monthly
# Based on luxury tax rate of 40% charged in years one to six of the contract.

At this point, it should be noted that there are more variables that need to be considered in order to increase the accuracy of the comparison. For starters, we’d need to determine the rate of return that the Yankees expect on their investments (it could be much more or less than 12%). Also, we’d need to have a better understanding of the team’s cash flow (i.e., does paying Lee compromise their liquidity to the point that they can not invest elsewhere). There is also the issue of taxes, which could mitigate the Yankees’ return on investment (although, considering the amount of debt held by the team as well as the favorable tax treatment it enjoys under the terms of its financing, that really might not be much of an issue), as well as inflation, which in a baseball sense would refer to the future direction of salaries (i.e., how much will star pitchers be paid 6-7 years from now). Having noted these caveats, the analysis still illustrates there are very sophisticated ways to evaluate long-term contracts that go well beyond how much an aged All Star is making during the final years of his deal.

Should the Yankees go to seven years with Lee? Or should six be the limit? It doesn’t really matter. What the Yankees need to do is decide upon a limit in terms of present day dollars, not contract years. Only after factoring in all the variables, can such a limit be determined. Then again, there probably is one other variable that also needs to be considered….the competitiveness of Hal Steinbrenner. We know how it would have factored into a negotiation with his father, but it remains to be seen how it will influence the son.

Posted in Baseball, Business and Finance, MLB, Rumors, Yankees | Tagged | Leave a Comment »

“Angry” Jeter Rejoins Happy Family; Yankee Captain Stands Tall as Recent Critics Shrink

December 7, 2010 by William Juliano

Derek Jeter and the Yankees re-consummated their relationship with a somewhat awkward press conference today at Steinbrenner Field in Tampa. Despite calmly admitting that he was “angry” about the public nature of the process (as only Jeter could), the Yankees shortstop reiterated his dedication to the organization and described all involved parties as “one big happy family”.

Today’s reunion was strange to say the least, particularly because such an inevitable outcome seemed to create so many improbable storylines. For whatever reason, many in the media and the Yankees’ fan base seized upon the slow pace of the negotiations to denigrate, ridicule and vilify the team’s Hall of Fame shortstop, thanks in no small part to the curiously public comments of Brian Cashman and ownership. As a result, the press conference welcoming Jeter back almost had the feeling of a reverse parable, with the Yankees’ organization playing the role of the prodigal son. After all, Jeter never left and never intended to, but the Yankees did stray from what should be the organization’s policy of holding its legacy in only the highest of regard.

It was impossible to look at Cashman and Hal Steinbrenner sitting at the dais and not think they probably felt a little bit guilty. Some of the reporters sitting in the audience probably felt the same way, not to mention a vocal segment of the fan base that seemed quick to turn on Jeter. All’s well that ends well, however, so, break out the robes, rings and sandals, and slaughter the fattened calf. The prodigal among us have returned to the fold, rejoining the Captain, who never left.

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Winter Meetings of Infamy: Gathered in Chicago, Baseball Magnates Confronted by Talk of War, Not Trades

December 7, 2010 by William Juliano

Baseball’s winter meetings have become an annual rite of passage for the sport. In the first month or so after the World Series, the Hot Stove mostly burns on embers, but once the game’s movers and shakers convene for a week of wheeling and dealing, the calendar seems to instantly turn to the upcoming season.

The attack on Pearl Harbor shocked the entire nation, including baseball executives who had gathered in Chicago for their annual winter meetings.

This year, baseball’s small world has descended on Disney World, where more than a few free agents’ dreams will come true. Back in 1941, however, the baseball winter meetings were host to a nightmare. As the magnates of the game gathered in Chicago on the morning of December 7, the first news about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor started to filter through. Not long after, all ears were glued to radio bulletins and, instead of talking trade, the discussion centered on the impending war. According to newspaper accounts at the time, the White Sox and Tigers half-heartedly discussed a deal, while the rival Dodgers and Giants also touched base, but the shocking news of the day proved to be too much of a distraction. Over the next few days, the focus of the meetings had turned from glad handing to hand wringing about what role baseball would play in the war effort.

“Don’t it beat hell, they attacked us without warning as they did the Russians years ago. No one can guess the impact [on baseball]. I would be going away out on the limb if I ventured a prediction.” – Baseball Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis, quoted by AP on December 7, 1941

President Roosevelt’s “Green Light Letter” expressing his desire that the 1942 baseball season be played.

Even though baseball would eventually get the blessing of both Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt to continue on with the 1942 season, it quickly became apparent that the landscape would be drastically altered. One day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bob Feller, who had already established himself as one of the game’s best pitchers, announced that he was enlisting in the Naval Reserve. Others, like Hank Greenberg, Cecil Travis, Buddy Lewis and Hugh Mulcahy, also quickly signed up for service. Eventually, over 500 major league players and 4,000 minor leaguers would serve the country in the armed forces, but despite being depleted, baseball would also soldier on.

“I don’t believe in draping the whole country in black. Certainly, professional baseball should be continued during the war. It encourages sports, helps preserve morale, and provides outdoor relaxation for thousands.” – Rep. James W. Wadsworth (NY), quoted by AP on January 8, 1942

Amid the doom and gloom, some baseball business did get done in Chicago. On December 12, after the meetings had broken up, Branch Rickey used the occasion to make one of his few blunders, trading away future Hall of Famer Johnny Mize for catcher Ken O’Dea and pitcher Bill Lohrman (who would be sold back to the Giants in May) plus cash. Perhaps not surprisingly, even Rickey’s mistake turned to gold as the Cardinals went on to win the 1942 World Series over the Yankees, and Mize lost the 1943-1945 seasons to the military.

The other significant news to come out of the Chicago meetings was the decision of both leagues to limit night games to seven per team instead of adopting a proposal to allow as many as 14. While voting on the measure, most baseball executives feared that if the season did proceed during the war, night games would be banned. Ironically, however, when President Roosevelt urged Commissioner Landis to proceed with the upcoming season, he recommended playing more night games so those working the day shift could still enjoy the national pastime.

In response to the President’s request, Commissioner Landis reconvened the game’s owners and an expansion of night baseball was enacted. Aside from those teams without suitable lights (Yankees, Red Sox, Tigers, Cubs and Braves), every team would now play 14 games under the stars (the Senators were permitted to play 21 because of that’s city’s higher number of day workers). One casualty, however, was the scheduled installation of lights at Wrigley Field. Over 165 tons of steel and 35,000 feet of copper had already been procured for the project, but after Pearl Harbor, Cubs’ owner Phil Wrigley decided to halt the construction and donate all materials to the war effort. As a result, it would take almost 50 more years until the first night game was played at Wrigley Field.

Baseball, like the rest of the country, would not only persevere through the war, but emerge even stronger. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Connie Mack, the 79-year old owner/manager of the Philadelphia Athletics who was born during the Civil War and lived through the Spanish-American conflict and First Great War, said it best. “I have faith in my country and trust in our people and we’ll be all right again,” the Tall Tactician told reporters gathered for his birthday celebration, “With the nation facing turbulent days, sports, and baseball in particular, are going to help relieve the pressure.” Mack was right on both counts.

Posted in Baseball, Baseball History, Culture, Yankees | Tagged , , | 3 Comments »

Happy Days Are Here Again…Except in San Diego; Big Contracts Making a Comeback, but Padres Remain on Side Lines

December 6, 2010 by William Juliano

Baseball’s recession is officially over. In case you weren’t paying attention when Bud Selig announced that the sport raked in $7 billion in 2010 (an over 15% spike during an economic downturn), the Nationals sent a friendly reminder by inking Jayson Werth’s to a mega-$126mn, seven-year deal.

Although many in the baseball world were left scratching their heads after the Nationals’ announcement, there really shouldn’t be any mystery. After a flattish period in 2008-2009 marked by “fiscal restraint”, baseball has resumed its exponential revenue growth, which should usher in an offseason of big money deals. By the spring, contracts to Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford and Cliff Lee should join Jayson Werth’s and Troy Tulowitzki’s as being among the most lucrative in the game’s history.

The first big sign that the market would be more robust this year occurred when Adam Dunn signed with the White Sox. Only two years earlier, the slugging first baseman/outfielder was forced to accept a two-year/$20 million deal at the age of 29. This year, however, he was rewarded with a four-year/$56 million deal (to likely be a DH no less). Also, in addition to throwing money at the big names, major league owners awash in cash have once again begun to extend their generosity to lesser players. Lance Berkman ($8 million), Rod Barajas $3.25 million and Juan Uribe ($21 million/three years) are just three examples of contracts that probably wouldn’t have been offered over the last two off seasons.

The return of bigger contracts isn’t a bad thing, although it will likely be portrayed as such. What it reveals is that the sport is not only financially healthy today, but the internal projections for future growth are robust. However, is this a case of the rich getting richer and a widening gulf between baseballs haves and have nots?

The Adrian Gonzalez trade to Boston has already been naively portrayed as “exhibit A” for why baseball needs an economic overhaul (i.e., a salary cap). And, you can’t blame people for feeling that way after listening to Padres GM Jed Hoyer talk about how the team couldn’t afford to re-sign him after the 2011 season. But, is that statement true?

2010 Operating Income, By Team ($ million)

Source: Forbes.com

According to Forbes, the San Diego Padres ranked fifth in baseball with $32.1 million in 2009 operating profit, despite having revenue near the bottom of the sport. I guess it helps to have a new ballpark built with 57% public financing? No one asked Hoyer why a team with such an impressive EBITDA couldn’t afford a player like Gonzalez, but too many in the media seem to accept it as a given that “smaller markets” can’t afford high priced free agents. If asked, he undoubtedly would have had a creative answer, but the bottom line is the Padres are more interested in their bottom line than place in the standings.

Ironically, during his press conference, Hoyer talked about hope for increased attendance and a new lucrative cable deal, both of which might help the team expand its payroll in the future. It was a curious statement because when it comes to making money, you usually have to spend it first. After all, can the Padres really expect more fans in the seats if the team flounders in the NL West? Also, wouldn’t it have more leverage negotiating a cable deal while the team is playing well? Maybe Hoyer thinks the team can still be competitive, but without Gonzalez, it’s hard to see how the already offense-starved Padres are going to score any runs at all. After surprising the baseball world with a 90 win season in 2010, the Padres now seem poised for an immediate return to the cellar. If that happens, why should San Diego care about the Padres?

Since 2002, the Padres’ franchise value has increased 132%, while its revenue has increased 87%, according to Forbes. Meanwhile, its payroll rose only 5%, which helps explain how the team went from an $8 million EBITDA loss to over $32 million in operating profit last year. How much more successful (both on the field and in the board room) could the team have been if it invested more of its growth into players? We’ll never know, but the bigger question is whether the Padres are going to treat the current decade in the same manner as it did the last one? Unfortunately for fans in San Diego, it seems as if that might be the case. If so, their outrage shouldn’t be directed at the economics of the sport, but instead toward an ownership group reaping its benefits.

Posted in Baseball, Business and Finance, MLB, Red Sox | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments »

Hall of Fame Snubs Miller, Steinbrenner; Selection of Gillick Reveals Same Cracks in Committee Process

December 6, 2010 by William Juliano

(In addition to appearing at The Captain’s Blog, this post is also being syndicated at TheYankeeU.)

Pat Gillick was an accomplished baseball executive for well over 40 years, including 27 seasons as a general manager for four different franchises. Although he isn’t a blight on the Hall of Fame, his election this afternoon by the new Expansion Era committee process is an absurdity when juxtaposed against the exclusion of two much more worthy candidates.

Marvin Miller, flanked by Joe Torre, announces the end of the first player’s strike (Photo: AP).

The mission of the Hall of Fame is (or at least should be) to honor excellence and preserve history, but unfortunately, the new era-based committee process seems just as prone to the cronyism that corrupted past iterations. One could not write the story of baseball’s expansion era, which the Hall of Fame defines as 1973 to the present, without devoting massive chapters to the contributions of MLBPA executive director Marvin Miller (1966 to 1982) and Yankees’ principal owner George M. Steinbrenner III (1973-2010). By excluding each member, the Hall of Fame is presenting an incomplete history…one influenced more by personal relationships than impact on the game.

The argument against Miller seems to be from those who think free agency ruined the game. “Because of the fiery union leader, the wholesome sport of baseball was undermined by greedy players no longer interested in simply playing for the love of the game”, Miller’s detractors have usually argued in one way or another. Sadly, such sentiment is pervasive, even though Miller’s labor revolution ushered in an era of growth and competitive balance. If he was an NFL commissioner, he’d be widely lauded as a hero. In the baseball world, however, he is still viewed by many as an enemy, especially by former executives who failed time and time again when squaring off against him at the bargaining table. By collecting 11 of 12 votes needed, Miller just missed joining Gillick, but as long as the committee contains a strong element of his past adversaries, getting over the hump could be difficult.

Steinbrenner was an industry leader during his tenure as Yankees owner.

Steinbrenner’s exclusion comes as a surprise because it seemed as if part of the reason for the Hall’s new voting process was so the recently deceased Yankee owner could be awarded with immediate posthumous enshrinement. Incredibly, however, he received less than eight votes. Even Dave Concepcion received eight! There is no legitimate argument for not electing Steinbrenner. The history of baseball without mention of Steinbrenner is simply incomplete, and that fact should override any other concern. The idea that his two suspensions should detract from his overall contribution to the game is ill conceived, especially because a careful look at each situation reveals that Steinbrenner was unfairly treated during both investigations. Putting that aside, the bottom line is George Steinbrenner was arguably the most gigantic figure during the expansion era, so having fewer than half the electors recognize his accomplishments doesn’t speak well for the process.

Getting back to Gillick, his three world championships and 2,276-1,388 record as a general manager are impressive, but are they Hall of Fame worthy? The only other men who have been elected purely as front office executives are all legendary figures in the game: Ed Barrow, who was the architect of the first Yankees’ dynasty; George Weiss, who carried the flag from Barrow by winning seven World Series in the Bronx; and Branch Rickey, who was a pioneer in so many regards, not the least of which was his role in breaking the color barrier. Two other men elected based largely on contributions as an executive were Larry and Lee McPhail. Again, both father and son left behind a legendary imprint on the game well beyond wins and losses. With all due respect to Gillick, he has not had the same impact as the front office executive he now joins in the Hall of Fame.

Most of the unworthy Hall of Fame selections in the past have emanated from the backroom politics of the veteran’s committee process. Instead of focusing on the historical integrity of enshrinement, committee members lobbied for friends and ex-teammates, resulting in more than a few curious selections. Sadly, it seems as if that process hasn’t changed. By having 16 contemporary voters preside over friend and enemy alike, the vote is almost certain to be impacted by personal bias.

Marvin Miller and George Steinbrenner were such towering figures that their legacies will grow regardless of whether they are elected to the Hall of Fame. It is a shame, however, that for at least the next three years, visitors to that institution will be witness to an incomplete history.

Posted in Baseball, Baseball History, Hall of Fame, Yankees | Tagged , , | 2 Comments »

Trying to Guess the Yankees and Jeter’s “Highly Unusual” Option

December 4, 2010 by William Juliano

According to Michael S. Schmidt of the New York Times Bats Blog, the Yankees and Derek Jeter are close to a three-year agreement that will include a “highly unusual” and “creative hybrid-type option”. In his post, Schmidt includes the words “for a fourth year”, but doesn’t attribute them to his source. So, maybe the creative option doesn’t have anything to do with an extension of the contract? Either way, below are three guesses at what the deal’s creative addendum might be.

1)      A mutual option based on performance in the first three years

Assuming the two sides could agree to a formula, the value Jeter provided during the contract could be evaluated against the money paid to him. In other words, if the formula determined Jeter provided $40 million in value, it would be subtracted from the rumored $52 million contract total. Then, that $12 million difference would be used to fund a fourth year, which might be predetermined at something like $25 million (the annual value of Jeter’s rumored first request). As a result of the math, the Yankees would then have the option of paying Jeter $13 million in 2014. If they declined the option, a percentage buyout could be included. Similarly, if Jeter outperformed his contract, the amount would be added to the same $25 million starting point, but with a higher percentage buyout included if the Yankees declined. In both cases, negotiated minimums and maximums could be determined. Also, the contract could include conditions under which Jeter would be able to opt out of the fourth year.

Highly Unusual? Yes. Creative? I’ll leave that for you to decide.

2)      An option to buy part of the team upon retirement

As mentioned above, there is no confirmation that the “ creative option” involves a fourth year. So, why not offer Jeter the chance to become an owner?

Baseball rules prohibit active players from owning equity in a major league franchise, but what about a future invitation to buy a stake? If permissible, the “creative option” would give Jeter the right to acquire a specified interest in the team at pre-determined cost. Considering the exponential way the Yankees’ value has been increasing, such an option would be highly attractive to the business-minded Jeter, even if the eventual sale price is close to market value. From the Yankees’ perspective, having Jeter become a limited partner would not only provide some cash flow, but also ensure an even closer association with the team than might otherwise be expected (i.e., more than just throwing out first pitches and attending Old Timers Day).

3)      A personal services contract upon retirement

Just in case option #2 is against major league rules, the Yankees could accomplish a similar end by transitioning Jeter to an “employee” when his playing days are over.

One of the arguments made by the Jeter camp is his “brand value” should be incorporated into the value of his new contract. The Yankees have argued that to build a winner, its focus must remain on the field. So, why not compromise and offer to compensate Jeter for the value he adds to the business side…but hold off on most of it until he is finished playing? Whether it’s a 10-year, 20-year or lifetime deal, the advantage of the personal services contract is it wouldn’t count as payroll and therefore not be calculated against the luxury tax. Also, if it includes work done for YES, the Yankees’ partners in the venture would share the cost.

Thankfully, the two sides have replaced the intrigue about whether a deal would get done with how it will be structured. The solutions mentioned above are probably too unusual to actually be considered, but who knows. Your guess (feel free to leave one in the comments section below) is as good as mine.

Posted in Baseball, MLB, Rumors, Yankees | Tagged | 3 Comments »

Does Adrian Gonzalez Make the Red Sox Better?

December 4, 2010 by William Juliano

(In addition to appearing at The Captain’s Blog, this post is also being syndicated at TheYankeeU.)

Over the last 24 hours, the Boston Red Sox and San Diego Padres have all but agreed to a deal that would send All Star 1B Adrian Gonzalez headed east for a package of prospects. Although no one can dispute Gonzalez’ talents as a player, does the move alone make the Red Sox better?

The Red Sox hope to add Gonzalez’ powerful opposite field swing to their lineup.

There are two small red flags with Gonzalez. The first is he has played most of his career in one of the weakest divisions in baseball: the National League West. Because performance is best measured relative to competition, the Padres’ 1B may not be as successful playing in the AL East. Again, that’s not really a major concern, but it could suggest a lower level to what should be high expectations. The second question mark deals with Gonzalez’ recent surgery to repair his injured right shoulder. Speaking on XX1090AM in San Diego, the Padres’ slugging 1B indicated the surgery would require a long rehab and that he might not be able to swing a bat for 4-5 months. That was on November 10. Doing the math, it’s possible that Gonzalez will not be ready to take his normal cuts until at least Spring Training, but perhaps as late as Opening Day.  If the latter, it’s very possible that Gonzalez wouldn’t be in peak form until several weeks, or months, into the season.

Even with both of those concerns noted, acquiring Gonzalez is close to a no-brainer for the Red Sox, provided they are able to sign him to a long-term contract. Of course, picking up star players in the trade market also comes with another cost, which in this case could be Casey Kelly (ranked 18th overall by ESPN’s Keith Law), the team’s top prospect. If the combination of money expended (Gonzalez’ 2011 salary is a low $6.3 million, but a renegotiated deal could inflate that figure) and prospects traded prevent the team from making another acquisition (e.g., Jayson Werth, Carl Crawford, Justin Upton, etc.), the end result might not look so good.

Finally, if the deal for Gonzalez is consummated, that likely means the end of Adrian Beltre’s brief time in Boston. Going forward, it’s almost certain that Gonzalez will be a more productive hitter than Beltre. However, it isn’t for sure that he’ll perform much better than Beltre did in 2010. So, when you also consider Beltre’s top-shelf defense at a key position like third, the exchange becomes even less favorable. After all, Gonzalez’ gold glove at 1B will be replacing Kevin Youkilis’, who would be asked to move across the diamond to third, where he isn’t as sound defensively. Even if Youkilis is able to play third base at an acceptable level, he likely will not be in the class of Beltre. As a result, with all things considered, the Red Sox could be taking a step back in terms of infield defense.

With the departure of Beltre and Victor Martinez, the Red Sox have some ground to make up on offense. Without a doubt, Adrian Gonzalez goes along way toward doing just that. However, Boston will need its new acquisition to be healthy as well as able to make a quick adjustment to the AL East. What’s more, after wrapping up the deal, the Red Sox will need to have enough flexibility to make another addition. If everything falls into place, the deal should revive Boston’s standing in the division, but if the questions mentioned above are not answered in the affirmative, the benefit of adding Gonzalez might wind up being a more long-term proposition.

Posted in Baseball, MLB, Red Sox, Rumors, Trades | Tagged , | 2 Comments »

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