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The American League Cy Young race was seen by many as a battleground between modern sabremetrics and old fashioned statistical analysis. As a result, the “controversial” selection of Felix Hernandez was heralded in some corners as the dawning of an age of enlightenment, while in others it was viewed as a turn to the “dark side”.

There’s no point in trying to settle that debate because both sides seem firmly entrenched in their positions. What is more interesting, however, is whether or not Hernandez’ selection represented much of a change in the thought process used by the BBWAA voters to elect the Cy Young.

As Tyler Kepner noted in the New York Times’ Bats Blog, one really didn’t need to delve too deeply in advanced metrics in order to appreciate Hernandez’ accomplishments in 2010. Even though he was a pedestrian 13-12, the Mariners’ ace led the league in ERA and placed second in strikeouts (only one behind the leader), two statistics that have factored into historical voting almost as much as wins.

Without a doubt, wins have always played a role in selecting the Cy Young. In the American League, 26 of the 45 winners since 1967 (the first year a separate award was given in each league) led in wins, while 39 came within 10% of the league-leading total. After removing the four relief pitchers who won the award, the percentage increases to 63% and 95%, respectively. In the National League, 64% of non-reliever Cy Youngs finished first in wins, while 79% finished within 10% of the best total. Combined, the correlation between the Cy Young and win total is stronger than any other statistic.

Cy Youngs Who Have Not Finished Within 10% of League Leader in Wins

Note: Relievers excluded from consideration.
Source: Baseball-reference.com

When you consider that the last two AL Cy Youngs, Zack Greinke (84% of top win total) and Hernandez (62% of top win total), are the league’s only award winners to not finish within 10% of the leading win total, it does seem as if there has been a philosophical change among the voters. After taking a deeper look, however, it becomes clear that Cy Young voters have never lived by wins alone.

Cumulative Rankings of Cy Young Award Winners in Three Traditional Statistical Categories

 

Wins

ERA

SO

  Leader Within 10% Leader Within 10% Leader Within 10%
AL 63% 95% 44% 76% 22% 41%
NL 64% 79% 33% 85% 44% 59%

Note: Relievers excluded from calculation of percentages; the American League had two award winners in 1969.
Source: Baseball-reference.com

As illustrated in the chart above, both ERA and strikeouts have a strong relationship to winning the Cy Young. In fact, in the National League, a higher percentage of winners have come within 10% of leading in ERA than wins. Nonetheless, the correlation to wins is still significantly stronger, but a few caveats are in order. Because ERA is a rate statistic, there is not only more room for variance, but qualified pitchers with much fewer innings pitched are not disadvantaged as they would be with cumulative totals. Also, although strikeouts, like wins, are cumulative, the league leading total is often 10-15x more than the best win mark. Again, this introduces more variance among the leaders. After taking those two qualifications into account, it certainly seems as if voters have always given very careful consideration to both ERA and strikeouts.

Relative Performance of Cy Young Winners in Wins, Strikeouts and ERA

  Leader in all 3 categories Leader in at least 2 categories Leader in at least 1 category
AL 10% 37% 83%
NL 10% 38% 92%
       
  Top 10% in all 3 categories Top 10% in at least 2 categories Top 10% in at least 1 category
AL 29% 73% 100%
NL 28% 82% 100%

Note: Relievers excluded from calculation of percentages; the American League had two award winners in 1969.
Source: Baseball-reference.com

In the National League, only three Cy Young starters have failed to lead at least one of the three categories under consideration in this analysis, while seven have come up short in the AL. However, every award winner has at least finished among the top 10% in one category, with a large percentage achieving the feat in at least two. It should be noted, however, that among the 18 pitchers who only ranked in the top 10% of one category, 16 were listed among the leaders in wins (including 14 who actually led their league). Only Greinke in 2009 (led the league in ERA; 84% of wins leader; and shade below 90% of strikeout leader) and Rick Sutcliffe in 1984 (traded to NL on June13; only finished among top-10% in ERA, but went 16-1 for Cubs) were able to buck that trend. So, although it seems as if voters have always considered more than just wins, they have often allowed a leading total in that category to obscure other relative deficiencies.

An evolution in the criteria that beat writers use to vote on awards like the Cy Young certainly seems to be underway. However, it would be stretch to suggest that this gradual tidal shift is really a sea change. As startling as Felix Hernandez’ win total may be (at 62% of the leading total, it is the lowest among all non-relievers since 1967), he still led the league in ERA and strikeouts (he was actually one behind Jered Weaver, but based on rounded percentage was within 100% of the leading total), which has usually been good enough to win the Cy Young.

Pitchers Who Led Their League in Strikeouts and ERA, but Didn’t Win the Cy Young Award

Year ERA/K Leader Wins WAR Cy Young Wins WAR
1970 Tom Seaver 18 6 Bob Gibson 23 8.7
1971 Tom Seaver 20 9.2 Fergie Jenkins 24 9.2
1979 J.R. Richard 18 6 Bruce Sutter 6 4.6
1987 Nolan Ryan 8 5.5 Steve Bedrosian 5 2.6
2002 Pedro Martinez 20 5.7 Barry Zito 23 6.5

Source: Baseball-reference.com

Of the five times (out of 21 cases) that the electorate turned away from the ERA/strikeout leader, it either awarded a reliever or the league leader in wins. Of the latter, however, each pitcher also happened to have a higher WAR: Jenkins and Gibson were the league leaders in their Cy Young season, while Zito finished a close third behind Roy Halladay (6.9) and Tim Hudson (6.6). Interestingly, the correlation to WAR doesn’t stop there. The baseball-reference.com blog ran a comparison of Cy Young winners to WAR and found that 46 of the 80 non-relievers (58%) actually led the league in the website’s calculation of the metric, which isn’t far from the 64% correlation to the stodgy old wins category. This really shouldn’t come as much of a surprise, however, considering our previous discussion. As foreign and advanced as WAR may seem, common place metrics like strikeouts and those that influence ERA play a significant role in many sabremetric constructs.

So, let the philosophical battle rage on. Hernandez’ Cy Young victory doesn’t belong to either side.

The word out of the General Managers meetings in Orlando is the plan to expand the major league baseball playoffs to 10 teams is moving full speed ahead. According to numerous reports, Commissioner Bud Selig, who has been pushing the proposal with a heavy hand, intends to finalize a recommendation after convening his special committee at the winter meetings in December. Ultimately, any plan would have to be approved by both the owners and players before being implemented, but the early signs point toward acceptance from both.

The initial negative reaction to expanding the post season centers on potential damage to the integrity of the regular season as well as the possible dilution of the playoffs by permitting lesser teams to participate. Both of those concerns are certainly valid, but don’t they exist under the current system anyway?

I think the more teams you have in it, the month of September will obviously be more meaningful. The minuses: two of them obviously are the integrity of the schedule and the history of the game, where you know the best teams always moved forward. But we really crossed that bridge, didn’t we, when we went from two teams to four teams, and then four teams to eight teams? So that bridge has been crossed. I’ve changed. I could add more teams.” – Toronto Blue Jays president Paul Beeston, quoted by AP

Beeston’s fatalist attitude isn’t exactly what you’d like to hear from one of the lords of the game, but does he have a point?

What History Would Have Been Like with a Second Wild Card

“Second” AL Wild Card W L Rank   Actual AL Wild Card W L Rank
2010 Red Sox 89 73 5 Yankees 95 67 2
2009 Rangers 87 75 4 Red Sox 95 67 3
2008 Yankees 89 73 4 Red Sox 95 67 3
2007 Tigers/Mariners 88 74 5 Yankees 94 68 3
2006 White Sox 90 72 5 Tigers 95 67 3
2005 Indians 93 69 5 Red Sox 95 67 2
2004 Athletics 91 71 5 Red Sox 98 64 2
2003 Mariners 93 69 4 Red Sox 95 67 3
2002 Red Sox/Mariners 93 69 5 Angels 99 63 3
2001 Twins 85 77 5 Athletics 102 60 2
2000 Indians 90 72 4 Mariners 91 71 3
1999 Athletics 87 75 5 Red Sox 94 68 4
1998 Blue Jays 88 74 4 Red Sox 92 70 2
1997 Angels 84 78 5 Yankees 96 66 2
1996 Mariners 85 76 5 Orioles 88 74 4
Average 88.8 73.1 4.7     94.9 67.1 2.7
Median 89 73 5     95 67 3

“Second” NL Wild Card

W L Rank   Actual NL Wild Card W L Rank
2010 Padres 90 72 5 Braves 91 71 3
2009 Giants 88 74 5 Rockies 92 70 3
2008 Mets 89 73 4 Brewers 90 72 3
2007 Padres 89 74 4 Rockies 90 73 2
2006 Phillies 85 77 4 Dodgers 88 74 2
2005 Phillies 88 74 4 Astros 89 73 3
2004 Giants 91 71 5 Astros 92 70 4
2003 Astros 87 75 5 Marlins 91 71 3
2002 Dodgers 92 70 5 Giants 95 66 4
2001 Giants 90 72 4 Cardinals 93 69 1
2000 Dodgers 86 76 5 Mets 94 68 4
1999 Reds 96 67 5 Mets 97 66 4
1998 Giants 89 74 5 Cubs 90 73 4
1997 Mets/Dodgers 88 74 4 Marlins 92 70 2
1996 Expos 88 74 4 Dodgers 90 72 3
Average 89.1 73.1 4.5     91.6 70.5 3.0
Median 89 74 5     91 71 3

The two charts above display the actual wild card winner and what would have been the second wild card in each league since 1996 (the first 162-game season of divisional play). As you can see, the wild card really hasn’t diluted the post season in the American League, as evidenced by the average and median wild card record of 95-67. Adding a fifth team, however, would include a participant with an average and median record of 89-73, which doesn’t look as good. Then again, the National League wild card really hasn’t been much better. While a potential second NL wild card would also have posted an average record of 89-73, the wild card team already in place has only been two games better.

The first question to consider is why has the American League wild card been so strong (the answer to which may also explain why the league as a whole has been vastly superior over the past decade)? Of the 15 American League wild cards, 11 have come from the East division, and seven of those teams finished second to the Yankees. What appears to be happening is a sort of Yankee-effect in which American Leagues teams, particularly those in the East, have been forced to improve their organization-wide efficiency in an attempt to keep up with the growing dominance of the pinstripes. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Boston, which has won almost half of the American League wild cards.

It is notable that the potential second wild card team in each league would have had essentially the same record over the past 15 seasons. What this suggests is that regardless of the fluctuations in league quality, 89 wins will probably be the average total for a second wild card. Of course, with the incentive of an added playoff spot, it remains to be seen what impact that will have on team records. Will fewer teams be willing to make mid-season trades, thereby lessening the ability of the elite clubs to strengthen themselves down the stretch? If so, the overall records of all playoff teams could suffer. Or, will the middling clubs all bolster themselves and, in the process, define the middle up at the expense of a much softer underbelly? It seems as if the impact could go either way.

Normally, the idea of diluting the regular season would be abhorrent to me. After all, baseball’s heart and soul is its 162-game marathon, and not the one-month sprint conducted in October. However, based on the information above, I am not sure there would be much of a dilution, at least not much greater than what exists now. In fact, if constructed with just a little bit of common sense, an extra wild card might actually return integrity back to the regular season.

If the eventual proposal advanced by the Commissioner’s special committee serves the purpose of placing both wild cards at a disadvantage, then it would actual once again place great importance on winning a division title. In this year’s AL East “race”, the Rays and Yankees, both of whom were assured a playoff spot, made a mockery of the regular season by playing the last month like Alphonse and Gaston. Under a proposal in which the two wild cards would first have to hash it out in a short series, teams would no longer treat September with such indifference. Ultimately, that would serve the purpose of increasing the relevance of the regular season without diluting the playoffs, especially if the American League’s superior wild card environment was to normalize more along the lines of the National League.

As a purist, accepting expanded playoffs may just be another example of losing a battle to win the war. That same philosophy has been used by teams to eschew division titles when they had the safety of the wild card as a back-up. Because it’s become so prevalent, baseball might as well put that Machiavellian strategy to good use.

The current wild card system has often replaced pennant races with an “I don’t want it, you take it” attitude.

Most of the news coverage emanating from MLB’s General Managers meetings in Orlando has centered on proposals for adding more teams to the playoffs, but another very significant topic has gone relatively unnoticed: expanding the Rule IV amateur draft to include international players like those from the Dominican Republic.

In the Dominican Republic, the game of baseball is so popular, even the lifestock can't help, but join the action (Photo: mopupduty.com).

As I suggested back in April, the Rule IV draft is as responsible for the decline in domestic talent as any other development in the sport. Not only do the restrictive bonds of the draft make playing baseball less appealing to American athletes, but it also significantly reduces the incentive for major league teams to cultivate young talent. The simple response to leveling the playing field between American and international athletes has been to propose extending the scope of Rule IV requirements. Instead, baseball should not only resist such a change, but go even further and eliminate the Rule IV draft altogether.

In yesterday’s New York Times, Michael S. Schmidt wrote an interesting article about a growing investment opportunity in the Dominican Republic: young baseball players. Basically, individual investors (including professionals from across a wide spectrum of industries, including finance, politics, diplomacy and even major league baseball) have been establishing baseball academies in the Dominican Republic (video of one such establishment is presented below), much like major league teams have been doing for almost 30 years.

Schmidt’s reporting includes obligatory concern from MLB in the voice of Sandy Alderson, who before taking over as the Mets GM was in charge of overseeing baseball’s operations in the Dominican Republic, but the response seems rather transparent. After all, if private academies uncover players, it prevents major league teams from building an early relationship that can often lead to a favorable contract. Besides, the reason Sandy Alderson was working in the Dominican Republic was because major league baseball wasn’t exactly conducting itself in the most upstanding manner.

Also included in the report were objections from Indiana University professor David P. Fidler, who stated that the academies, which turn a profit by taking a percentage of bonuses given to their players, were basically “selling children”. Of course, that notion is absurd. The academies aren’t selling children. Instead, they are selling the talent that the academies helped develop. Again, it really isn’t any different from what the clubs have been doing for years. The only difference is the players now have an advocate with a direct incentive to negotiate as large a contract as possible.

Make no mistake about it. Not every academy is going to be reputable. Some players will likely be exploited. However, that’s always been the case. Ultimately, the number of opportunities provided to those without comparable alternatives well outweighs the potential for harm.

Coming full circle, one wonders if the impetus to expand the Rule IV draft stems from baseball’s desire to nip these private academies in the bud. If they aren’t able to negotiate large free agent bonuses, the economics of their business model becomes less compelling. In addition, the major league clubs would longer have to worry about bidding against each other for high profile talent. Instead, they could simply draft the international player and then exert the tremendous force of the reserve rules upon them. No longer free agents, how many young, impoverished players from Latin American will be able, much less willing, to sit out a year if they aren’t happy with the contract being offered?

Hopefully, the player’s union does not abandon their international brethren. Even though the current system does put American-born players at a disadvantage, evening the playing field shouldn’t be about two wrongs making a right. Instead, the MLBPA should be pushing for abolition of the draft altogether. Just think about how much private and team investment would take place in U.S. cities if there was economic advantage to finding and developing talent at such an early age.

The best way to reinvigorate the American athlete’s participation in baseball is to remove the restrictions. Unfortunately, that isn’t likely to happen. Hopefully, baseball doesn’t compound its mistake at home by making the same one all around the world.

(This is the beginning of a series on infamous or controversial historical figures who also had a notable association with baseball. For the second installment on Billy Sunday, click here, and for the third installment on Marty Bergen, click here.)

When the notorious bandit Willie Sutton was asked why he robbed banks, legend has it that he matter-of-factly replied, “It’s where the money is”. When Cliff Lee eventually signs his mega free agent contract, his motivation will likely be the same, but when it comes to money, baseball players aren’t always as honest as bank robbers. Just ask John Dillinger. He tried his hand in both professions.

Dillinger was gunned down outside the Biograph theatre in Chicago.

On July 22, 1934, the Yankees swept a doubleheader from the White Sox at Comiskey Park. In the first game, Babe Ruth pushed aside father time and an injured leg to knock in four runs and belt homerun number 702, one of his last in pinstripes. Meanwhile, over on the North side of town, the nation’s public enemy number one had decided to take in a movie at Chicago’s Biograph theatre. Unfortunately for Dillinger, as he and two female companions (his girlfriend and Anna Sage, the infamous “lady in red” who betrayed him) watched Clark Gable in Manhattan Melodrama, the FBI was waiting in ambush. Only moments after leaving the theatre, Dillinger was shot at least twice, including once in the chest and once in the back of the head. No longer the most wanted man in America, Dillinger’s lifeless body now laid face down in the street amid a pool of his own blood. Perhaps he should have gone to the baseball game instead?

John Dillinger has taken up baseball as a pastime to while away the hours spent in eluding the law enforcement agents of the nation”. – UPI, June 28, 1934

The idea of Dillinger attending the White Sox vs. Yankees doubleheader isn’t far fetched at all. During his time in Chicago, Dillinger was believed to have attended several baseball games, including a contest between the Cubs and Dodgers at Wrigley Field on June 26, 1933. According to eye-witness Robert Volk, Dillinger took a seat beside him in at the top of the bleachers before departing during the seventh inning stretch.

Dillinger depicted in a baseball card created by Dave Stewart, a Vietnam veteran who created several picture card sets to raise money for disabled American veterans.

Anyone who had known Dillinger in his youth would likely not have been surprised that he had risked capture to take in a major league game. After all, aside from crime, baseball was perhaps Dillinger’s greatest passion.

At various stages of his life, Dillinger not only played the game, but did so with notable accomplishment. His first known exploits were as a member of a local club in Mooresville, Indiana, the farming town where Dillinger’s family relocated. Part of the motivation for the move was the senior Dillinger’s attempt to get Johnnie, as he was known as a boy, to settle down and turn away from the life of petty crime that had dogged him in Indianapolis. Unfortunately for his father, Dillinger’s success as a second baseman and pitcher for the local team did little to curb his deviant behavior.

Dillinger eventually joined and then deserted the Navy in 1923 before settling in Martinsville, Indiana and eventually getting married on April 12, 1924, just in time for the start of the baseball season. According to Elliott J. Gorn, author of Dillinger’s Wild Ride, the future bank robber was “good enough to pitch and play shortstop on a Martinsville semiprofessional team”. Even if Dillinger wasn’t really pro-material, he was certainly good enough to earn some extra cash playing ball. In fact, he even earned a $25 bonus from a local furniture store for being the best hitter on the Martinsville team. Unfortunately, when the season ended in August, Dillinger had little prospects for a job and no means to replace the income he had been receiving from playing baseball.

Dillinger (top row, far right) pictured with his teammates on the Martinsville, IN semi-pro baseball team.

Even in his early days as a youth in Indianapolis, Dillinger was predisposed toward the wrong side of the law, but it wasn’t until meeting William Edgar Singleton (a distant relative of his step mother and umpire in the league in which he played) that his life turned down the path that would lead him to his demise outside the Biograph.

Like Dillinger, Singleton was a petty criminal who was in need of some quick cash. According to most accounts, the older Singleton recruited Dillinger to assist in a stick up. The target was Frank Morgan, an elderly grocer who was known to carry the day’s receipts with him after closing up the shop. So, on September 6, the plan was hatched. During the attempted assault, however, Morgan managed to fight off Dillinger, discharging the latter’s gun in the process. Scared away by the shot, Dillinger fled on foot while Singleton sped off alone in the getaway car.

Because of his odd behavior following the botched robbery, suspicion was immediately cast upon Dillinger, who, taking his father’s advice, immediately confessed to the crime with the hope of receiving leniency. There was none forthcoming. Dillinger was sentenced to 10-20 years in the Indiana State Reformatory. Meanwhile, Singleton, now being called the “accomplice”, was convicted of a lesser crime and only served two years.

For the first time, baseball had steered Dillinger wrong. To that point, it had been a stabilizing force in his life, but now, thanks to the influence of Singleton, it proved to be his downfall. While in prison, however, Dillinger didn’t turn away from the game. In his attempt to be a model prisoner and earn an early release, Dillinger participated in several prison activities, but it was baseball that proved to be his greatest solace, especially after his wife served him with a divorce five years into his sentence.

On the day before his first parole hearing, Dillinger played in a prison baseball game in front of Indiana Governor Harry Leslie, one of the men who would preside over his fate the next day. According to John Toland, author of The Dillinger Days, the convict played so well in the game that the governor told an Indianapolis reporter, “That kid ought to be playing major league ball”. The rest of the parole board apparently did not agree. His parole was denied.

One of Dillinger's many mugshots.

This is the point where most historians believe Dillinger, whose bitterness over the unfairness of his sentence was now compounded by the denial for parole, crossed over the edge. However, despite his shock over the decision, baseball still wasn’t far from his mind. When asked if he had anything to say before returning to prison, Dillinger requested a transfer to the Michigan City State Penitentiary. Confused by the odd preference for a tougher prison, a trustee on the board asked why. “I want to go up there and play baseball. They have a real team,” Dillinger replied, according to Toland’s book. With prodding from Governor Leslie, Dillinger’s request was granted.

Well, baseball season is nearly here but I don’t care to try for the team here although I love to play, if I hadn’t played on the team at the reformatory, I don’t think I would have been sent up here; and I’m sure I would have made a parole there this Winter, so you can see why I am not so enthusiastic about making this team”. – John Dillinger, in a letter home from the Spring of 1930, from The Dillinger Days by John Toland

Life at the state penitentiary wasn’t what Dillinger expected, and he soon came to regret his decision, even going so far as to convince himself the denial of his parole and subsequent transfer were really motivated by the board’s desire to have him play shortstop for Michigan City. When baseball stopped being his favorite prison pastime, it was replaced by the lessons in a criminal lifestyle being offered by fellow inmates like Russell Clark, Harry Pierpont and Homer Van Meter, all of whom would eventually join Dillinger’s notorious gang. Any fanciful notions about playing profession baseball were now replaced by plans for a future of robbing banks, but Dillinger still needed to be released from prison to put his new ambitions into action. The opportunity finally came on May 10, 1933, when he was granted parole.

Public Enemy #1.

Almost immediately upon being released, Dillinger returned to a life a crime, adding bank robbery to his already lengthy rap sheet. Once again, however, he was quickly captured and pled guilty to the charges. While awaiting extradition to the Ohio state penitentiary in Columbus, Dillinger penned a letter to his niece, with whom he had developed a strong bond, and expressed as one of his regrets his inability to drive to Washington and New York to attend the World Series being played by the Senators and Giants.

Dillinger never made it to Columbus. On October 12, his fledgling gang was successful in breaking him out of prison, setting in motion a crime spree that included dozens of bank robberies and nearly as many murders. Unfortunately for Dillinger, however, the escape didn’t happen until five days after the Giants bested the Senators in the World Series.

Who knows…if not for Dillinger’s ill fated decision to rob a grocery store, one of the most notorious criminals in the nation’s history might have been better known for his contributions to the national pastime? Instead of robbing banks, he could have been stealing bases. Instead of knocking over police stations, he could have been knocking balls out of the park. Instead of gunning down law enforcement agents, he could have been throwing out base runners from the shortstop hole. It’s probably a leap to suggest that baseball could have been Dillinger’s salvation, but it does seem to be the only influence that could have steered him away from a life a crime. However, in an ironic twist, baseball actually helped lead him down his ill-fated path…one in which sliding into home was replaced by laying in a pool of blood on the corner of Fullerton Street and Lincoln Avenue.

Not surprisingly, the Yankees’ decision to raise select ticket prices wasn’t a warmly received announcement, but a careful examination of the increases reveals very little impact to the average fan.

Announced 2011 Season Plan Price Changes

Source: Yankees.com

As illustrated in the chart above, the season ticket price of the bleachers is absorbing the highest percentage increase at 25%, while most areas of the Main section are rising by about 10%. On the field level, a new section was carved out of a pre-existing one (see revised Stadium Plan below), bringing along with it a $5 bump. Otherwise, the only two lower level sections to see a spike were the MVP area, which is still down 20% over 2009, as well as the Field seats approaching the foul pole down each line (the first few rows of seats behind each outfield wall used to be included in that same section, but they have been broken out into a new area that retains the original pricing).

Although raising prices in a down economic period is probably bad public relations, especially when the largest percentage increase comes in the lowest-priced area, the Yankees’ decision isn’t a greedy money grab, but rather a prudent adjustment dictated by the market. Not only has the demand for Yankees’ tickets remained at a high level from the box office, but the emergence of a transparent secondary market (via websites like StubHub) has created the opportunity for the team to accurately gauge the relevancy of its prices. Anyone who has shopped for tickets at online auction sites is probably aware that although tickets in some sections of Yankee Stadium sell at a premium, many actually go for a sizeable discount.

Not ironically, the seats that often receive the highest markup are the cheapest ones to buy directly from the Yankees (after factoring in the secondary market, the bleachers can actually wind up being more expensive than sections of the grandstand). So, although it may seem like a case of “taxing the poor”, increasing the price of bleacher tickets was a fair market response. After all, in addition to being inexpensive, the Yankee Stadium bleachers also offer a terrific viewing location, a combination that has made it a widely coveted section.

We’re not trying to take away the ability of fans to make a profit when they resell tickets, but the ones where we raised prices were not selling for just above face, but were far above face.” – Lonn Trost, Yankees Chief Operating Officer, quoted by AP

As Trost noted, those taking a hit are season ticketholders who had been enjoying favorable resale prices over the last two seasons. In that sense, these season plan holders aren’t really encountering a price increase as much as a resale profit reduction. When looked at in that light, it’s really hard to fault the Yankees for wanting to narrow that margin a little when it’s become obvious that the face value established is well below the price that the market will support.

To this point, we’ve examined the season ticket prices, but the impact is much more muted for advanced and game-day individual sales. In the bleachers, the increase is reduced to $1, or 7%, while a few small increases are scattered across the field and main levels as well as the Mohegan Sun Sports Bar. Otherwise, the only significant advanced and game-day increase is the 14-17% bump for those seeking entry to the Audi Club.

Announced 2011 Advanced and Game-Day Prices (Changes Only)
Source: Yankees.com

It makes good copy to criticize the Yankees for raising ticket prices, but when you consider the amount of revenue that the team pours back into the product on the field, the nominal increases planned for 2011 seem well within reason. Considering the value available on the secondary market, as well as the many discount promotions being run by the team in 2011, going to the Stadium is still relatively affordable. Of course, it’d be nice if attending a Yankees game was as inexpensive as the good old days, but keep that wish in mind the next time you are screaming for the next high-priced free agent.

Revised Yankee Stadium Seating Chart

Source: Yankees.com

Ryan Sandberg has returned to the organization where his career began.

After losing out to Mike Quade in his bid to become manager of the Chicago Cubs, Hall of Famer and team icon Ryne Sandberg has left the organization to pursue a managerial opportunity with the Triple-A affiliate of the Philadelphia Phillies. Sandberg’s transfer is an ironic kind of homecoming. In one of the worst deals in major league history, the Phillies sent Sandberg and fellow future All Star Larry Bowa to the Cubs for Ivan de Jesus during the winter of 1982.

Had he been awarded the Cubs job, Sandberg would easily have become the current manager with the best playing career (and the best since Frank Robinson retired as manager of the Expos in 2006). Instead, they opted for Quade, who never played above the double-A level. Although likely unpopular in Chicago, history suggests the Cubs probably made the right decision. Not only doesn’t being a better player usually translate to being a better manager, but the opposite seems to be true. With that in mind, below is an “All Star” team of mostly “All Star” managers. To qualify for the list, candidates had to manage at least 700 games, win at least one pennant and maintain a winning percentage above .500. Then, the playing careers of all qualified managers were considered to determine the representative for each position. Listed below are those choices.

 
RHP: Clark Griffith, 1901-1920, White Sox, Highlanders (Yankees), Reds and Senators  
  IP W K ERA+ WAR
As Player 3385 2/3 237 955 122 49
  W L W-L% WS Penn
As Manager 1491 1367 0.522 0 1

*Inducted into the Hall of Fame as a player in 1946.
Source: Baseball-reference.com

Clark Griffith

Clark Griffith was a player/manager for four different organizations, but notably was the White Sox’ first manager as well as the Yankees’ first manager while in New York.  Despite winning only one pennant (in his first season as player/manager with the White Sox), Griffith finished his managerial career with 1,491 victories, which is still good for 20th all-time.

Although Griffith was also a mediocre outfielder, he was most known as a player for his accomplishments on the mound. A seven-time 20-game winner, Griffith, ended his career with 237 victories.

Honorable Mention: Bob Lemon won 207 games as a pitcher and 430 games as a manager, including two pennants and a World Series championship with the Yankees.

 
LHP: Tom Lasorda, 1976-1996, Dodgers

  IP W K ERA+ WAR
As Player 58 1/3 0 37 67 -0.2
  W L W-L% WS Penn
As Manager 1599 1439 0.526 2 4

*Inducted into the Hall of Fame as a manager in 1997.
Source: Baseball-reference.com

Tommy Lasorda always liked to say that he bled Dodger blue, and there was no denying he was a blue blood among managers. Lasorda’s 1,599 wins as a manager rank him 17th on the all-time list. He also owns four NL pennants and two World Series victories.

Lasorda makes it to this list solely on the basis of his managerial ability because he actually never won a game as a player. As only one of two left handed pitchers (Eddie Dyer being the other) who met the screening criteria, Lasorda’s competition was light, so this All Star team gets the benefit of including one of the games best ambassadors and entertaining storytellers.

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Carlos Beltran recently stated that he would like to finish his career with the New York Mets, but also suggested that he would accept a trade before his current seven year, $119 million dollar deal expires at the end of next season.

When the Mets signed Carlos Beltran, many thought the Yankees were foolish to let him slip away to Shea (Photo: NY Daily News).

Where has the time gone? It seems like just yesterday that Beltran, fresh off a spectacular postseason with the Astros, hit the free agent market as one of the hottest commodities in recent memory. With Bernie Williams’ decline evident and his days as a centerfielder dwindling, Beltran was regarded as a natural target for the Yankees, who were coming off an embarrassing 2004 ALCS loss to the Red Sox. At the time, however, the Yankees decided that they needed pitching more and couldn’t afford both an ace and top notch centerfielder like Beltran. So, instead, they opted to trade for Randy Johnson and then resign him to a two-year/$32 million dollar extension, which, combined with his 2005 salary and the $9 million sent to Arizona, amounted to a total commitment of $57 million over three years (or about the same annual value as the contract Beltran eventually signed with the Mets).

Even before Johnson proved to be a disappointment in New York, many questioned the wisdom of the Yankees’ choice, especially after Beltran offered the team a last minute discount. Those feelings only increased as Johnson departed just two seasons later and the Yankees struggled to fill their hole in centerfield, all while Beltran put up MVP-type numbers. With Beltran’s contract finally nearing its completion, however, we can just now begin to judge the true impact of the Yankees’ decision.

As mentioned, from the time Beltran signed with the Mets until the present day, the Yankees have had several centerfielders (from Bernie to Bubba to Damon to Melky and then some). So, in order to do a fair comparison, the first order of business is to create a composite player for each season under consideration. To do that, we’ve determined each player’s percentage of playing time in centerfield and then multiplied that rate by both runs created and salary. Although this approach doesn’t exactly isolate performance compiled while playing centerfield, or account for economic issues like sunk costs, it does provide a useful approximation of the resources the Yankees spent on the position as well as the performance they received from it.

Yankees’ Centerfielders, 2005 to 2010

2010 Inn  PT% RC RC*PT% Salary Salary*PT%
Granderson 1120 77.7% 82 63.7 $5,500,000 $4,270,857
Gardner 305 21.1% 75 15.9 $452,500 $95,687
Total       79.5   $4,366,544
2009 Inn PT% RC RC*PT% Salary Salary*PT%
Cabrera 806 1/3 55.6% 67 37.3 $1,400,000 $778,529
Gardner 628 2/3 43.4% 37 16.0 $414,000 $179,495
Total       53.3   $958,024
2008 Inn PT% RC RC*PT% Salary Salary*PT%
Cabrera 973 2/3 67.5% 42 28.4 $461,200 $311,483
Damon 285 19.8% 102 20.2 $13,000,000 $2,569,942
Gardner 160 2/3 11.1% 13 1.4 $41,400 $4,614
Total       50.0   $2,886,039
2007 Inn PT% RC RC*PT% Salary Salary*PT%
Cabrera 1072 2/3 73.9% 70 51.8 $432,400 $319,730
Damon 377 26.0% 83 21.6 $13,000,000 $3,378,447
Total       73.3   $3,698,176
2006 Inn PT% RC RC*PT% Salary Salary*PT%
Damon 1086 2/3 75.3% 108 81.3 $13,000,000 $9,785,269
Williams 200 13.9% 59 8.2 $1,500,000 $207,804
Crosby 117 8.1% 7 0.6 $354,250 $28,710
Total       90.0   $10,021,783
2005 Inn PT% RC RC*PT% Salary Salary*PT%
Williams 862 2/3 60.3% 56 33.8 $12,357,143 $7,451,138
Matsui 222 1/3 15.5% 114 17.7 $8,000,000 $1,243,243
Womack 150 10.5% 27 2.8 $2,000,000 $209,692
Crosby 144 2/3 10.1% 10 1.0 $322,950 $32,656
Cabrera 49 3.4% 1 0.0 $322,950 $11,061
Total       55.4   $8,947,791

Note: Players with less than 2% contribution excluded.
Source: Baseball-reference.com and Cots Contracts

Now that we have a snap shot of what the composite Yankees’ centerfielder looked like for each of the last six seasons, we can make a comparison to Beltran.

Cost and Production Comparison: Beltran vs. Yankees’ CF

  Carlos Beltran   Yankees CF’er
Year RC Salary $/RC   RC Salary $/RC
2005 82 $11,571,429 $141,115   54 $8,947,791 $165,700
2006 127 $13,571,428 $106,862   90 $10,021,783 $111,353
2007 109 $13,571,429 $124,509   73 $3,698,176 $50,660
2008 121 $18,622,809 $153,908   50 $2,886,039 $57,721
2009 66 $19,243,682 $291,571   53 $958,024 $18,076
2010 34 $19,401,569 $570,634   80 $4,366,544 $54,582
Total 539 $95,982,346 $178,075   400 $30,878,358 $77,196

In the 2005 ALDS, Bubba Crosby’s collision with Gary Sheffield proved costly. Since that season, the Yankees have had eight different centerfielders see significant time at the position.

As illustrated by the table above, the Yankees have spent over $100,000 less per run created from center field than they otherwise would have for Beltran, assuming he would have performed at similar levels in the Bronx. Obviously, Beltran’s injuries over the last two seasons have heavily tilted the scales toward the Yankees’ centerfield committee, but when you are assessing long-term deals, health becomes a major consideration. What really makes the comparison one-sided, however, is the Yankees’ ability to inexpensively create runs from centerfield (or in at least half the season, their willingness to accept very little production).

To this point, we’ve left out the defensive side of the argument, which is no small exclusion when you consider the importance of the position as well as Beltran’s glorified reputation for playing it. Unfortunately, defensive metrics do not allow for the same level of reliable analysis, but nonetheless, the UZR/150 rates for both Beltran and all Yankee centerfielders are presented below.

UZR/150 Comparison: Beltran vs. Yankees’ CF

Year Beltran Yankees CF
2005  -2.6 -37.2
2006 11.6 -12.2
2007 2.9 -9.8
2008 12.2 5.4
2009 -6 12.6
2010 -8.6 4.9

Source: www.fangraphs.com

As you can see, the Yankees were pretty awful in centerfield over the first half of the period, but since then have really picked it up. Beltran, meanwhile, only posted two outstanding defensive seasons, according to UZR/150. Again, these figures probably should be taken with a grain of salt, but that doesn’t mean Beltran’s overall superiority on defense should be ignored. Having said that, the Yankees strong defensive play in center has significantly mitigated that edge and probably doesn’t drastically change any conclusion derived from the offensive comparison.

The Yankees usually count success in terms of championships, so one could probably make the argument that Beltran’s 2006-2008 contribution would have made a World Series victory more likely in each of those seasons. Then again, one could probably also argue that Beltran’s 2009 salary would have prevented the Yankees from obtaining both Mark Teixeira and C.C. Sabathia, and we all know the implications of that scenario. In other words, it’s probably best to narrow our focus to the individual (or composite individual) performances of the players involved. On that basis, it seems as if the Yankees have been better off for not having signed Beltran.

One final note. This year, the Yankees are facing a similar decision to the one they encountered in 2004: sign an ace lefty (Cliff Lee) or a two-way outfielder (Carl Crawford). Although Lee is younger than Johnson was then, and Beltran was a better player than Crawford is now, the similarities are still intriguing. Based on early indications, it seems as if Brian Cashman has already opted for the pitcher, but if history is the judge, it may be wisest for the Yankees to ignore both.

The heck with history…go get Cliff Lee!

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