The Captain's Blog

Over the last couple of weeks there has been a lot of debate about the value of home field advantage in baseball. The discussion was crystallized most recently when the Yankees rested key bullpen members in their first place showdown against the Rays, but it has really be going on since the advent of the Wild Card.

Yesterday, we wondered about the value of finishing first from an accomplishment perspective, but ultimately, that is a very intangible way of looking at the question. At SI.com, Joe Seehan looked at home field advantage from a competitive standpoint and came to the conclusion that it really wasn’t an advantage at all. According to Sheehan’s research, the number one seed has advanced to the World Series in only eight of 24 chances since 1998, when the current playoff format was established. What’s more, over that span, the home team has only gone 45-39 in all post season series, according to Sheehan. In other words, there really isn’t a home field advantage in baseball during the postseason.

There is at least one more vantage point from which to consider this question, and it could very well be the most important…Economics.

In the post season, gate revenue (i.e., attendance) is divided between the players and hosting team using the following format:

• Players: 60% of gate receipts from first three games of LDS and first four games of LCS and World Series; no contribution from other games.
• Home team: 40%* of gate receipts from first three games of LDS and first four games of LCS and World Series; 100% of gate receipts from all other games.

*A small percentage (approximately 1.5%) of LDS gate receipts goes to the umpires, while 15% of LCS and World Series gate receipts go to MLB.

On the face of it, there seems to be an economic advantage to having home field. But, is it real, and if so, how significant is it?

The first step in the process is to take a look at the potential revenue opportunity for each permutation (because home field in the World Series is based on the All Star Game, it is not considered in this analysis). Based on the chart below, we can see that as a series goes longer, the economic advantage shifts to the home team, especially in the LCS. However, it is also apparent that in shorter series, the visiting team stands to make more money.

Exhibit 1: Possible Gate Revenue Scenarios

*Based on data compiled by Maury Brown, Bizofbasell.com (March 16, 2009)

An easy way to analyze the revenue potential for home and visiting teams is to look at best and worst case scenarios. As displayed in the chart below, being the home team in the LDS provides $1 million in greater guaranteed revenue , an advantage that can grow to as much as $5 million under a best case scenario. However, being the home team in the LCS has the potential to be even more important because although it does not provide an increased guarantee, it does offer a greater payoff in the event a series goes seven games.

Exhibit 2: Best/Worst Case Gate Revenue Scenarios

At this point, we still need to know the likelihood of each series going a particular amount of games. One way to determine that is by taking a look at past history. Unfortunately, however, there are only 12 seasons under the current format, so any conclusion will be compromised by the limited data available.

Exhibit 3: Length of LDS and LCS, 1998-2009

Based on the distribution displayed above, we can now assign a likelihood to each of the permutations in the first exhibit. By simply multiplying each revenue scenario by its likelihood of occurring and then summing the different totals, we can estimate the average take for home and visiting teams.

Exhibit 4: Likely Case Gate Revenue Scenarios

What do we have here? Apparently, when probability is factored into the equation, it appears as if the most advantageous financial position is for a team to be the visitor throughout the post season. The reason for this is kind of obvious. In the playoffs, the extra home game is back ended. Although that may be a competitive advantage, it actually gives the road team first crack at owning 100% of the pot. As a result, the home team’s greater reward, as defined by the best case scenario, comes at a small risk.

There are several flaws to these back of the envelope calculations, the most significant of which is probably the lack of enough data to provide confidence in defining the probability of each outcome. It would probably be better to use simulations for each of the teams potentially involved in the post season, but that’s really an exercise best left to individual teams assessing their respective opportunities.

Another thing to consider is this analysis only takes into account gate receipts. Other items like concessions and parking would also need to be factored into the equation. Because these items are not shared with the players, the revenue advantage would shift more toward the home team in the event of a short series.

Because the difference between home and road team gate receipts under “likely scenarios” is very small, the other factors in the equation basically dictate the advantage. In other words, the combination of the best case potential and revenue from additional sources means that there is a benefit to being the home team in the playoffs. Still, that advantage may not be enough to justify making a concerted effort to gain it.

Instead of trying to come up with various gimmicks to give teams an incentive to win their division and gain home field, perhaps the best approach would be to use the power of the purse. One possible solution would be to lessen the number of home games hosted by a lower seed, but that also has competitive implications, not to mention it deprives one fan base of seeing their team live (and possibly over saturates markets not know for selling out early round games). So, what could instead be done is maintain the number of home games, but adjust the portion that goes to each respective team. Obviously, the players still need to get their cut, but that doesn’t mean the teams can’t change how they divvy up theirs (and, if such a change needs to be a collectively bargained, an objection doesn’t seem apparent). MLB could institute a split in which the higher seed keeps all of its hosted revenue, while the lower seed is force to share theirs. Under a best case scenario, and even a likely case scenario, that could provide enough of an economic incentive for a team to go all out.

The most obvious criticism of such a format would be the wisdom of having the bottom line dictate the lineup, per se. But, if the desire is to incentivize winning as many games as possible, does the motive really matter? Instead of watering down the playoffs with an additional wild card, dangling a financial carrot might actually be the better option.

The Yankees logo may stand for pride and tradition in baseball circles, but according to a tally conducted by the New York Times, it is also the preferred fashion statement for criminals in New York City.

The survey, which was conducted by reviewing NYPD news releases, revealed that more than 100 people either committed a crime or were arrested/arraigned wearing Yankees apparel. Meanwhile, only about a dozen Mets hats popped up under such circumstances. Unfortunately for the Mets, however, one of those instances actually involved one of their players.

The New York Times story offered more than a few theories as to why Yankees apparel has become so popular among the criminal element, but one timely reason was what one criminologist called the “Jay-Z effect”. Maybe the rapper really has made “the Yankee hat more famous than a Yankee can”, but not in a desirable way?

According to Frankie Y. Bailey, an associate professor at the University of Albany, the Yankees apparel is a homage to the famous rapper and not the team. “He wears it and makes it look cool,” Bailey told the New York Times. “It’s almost like the Yankees have acquired a kind of street rep, a coolness.”

Several other just as credible theories were also advanced in the Times story, but the Yankees need to pay careful attention to Bailey’s statement. The image represented by the Yankee brand is not only important from a historical standpoint, but an economic one as well. Comingling that brand with elements beyond the game, whether it be rap, college football or whatever else, requires careful scrutiny because if damaged, it could be difficult to repair.

The Yankees current road trip has been a roller coaster ride, but one with very little enjoyment. The first four games had featured more chills than thrills, and, for the most part, thrown the team for a loop. Last night, however, the Yankees were finally able to enjoy the heights as the team rebounded to reverse a recent trend of extra inning losses and reclaimed their hold on first place.

Carl Crawford slides into Arod’s waiting tag for the final out in last night’s game. Greg Golson’s throw caught the Rays’ speedster trying to tag up on Matt Joyce’s fly ball (Photo: AP).

The Yankees entered the second game of their first place showdown with a bullpen of well rested relievers, but the main question was whether Ivan Nova would pitch well enough to make their availability relevant. Over the first four innings, however, the young righty pitched so well it didn’t seem as if there would be much need for going to the pen. Nova needed only 50 pitches to breeze through the first four frames, allowing only three base runners. In the meantime, the Yankees staked the rookie to a 6-0 lead as Matt Garza struggled to solve the mystery of Robinson Cano and Alex Rodriguez, who went a combined 5-10 with a five RBIs and a homerun a piece.

Coming on the heels of Monday’s brutal loss, the early dominance was quite an impressive bounce back statement. Then, the fifth inning happened. After surrendering a lead off homer to Carlos Pena and then a double to BJ Upton, Nova appeared to press, especially as relievers started to jog down the left field line to begin warming in the bullpen. It was just two starts ago that Girardi pulled Nova from a game only one out from qualifying for a win, so perhaps that was still fresh on his mind? Whatever the reason, Nova eventually allowed four runs to cross the plate before once again being lifted with two outs in the fifth.

Just as he did in Nova’s start against Toronto, Girardi called upon Boone Logan to clean up the mess, but this time, Joe Maddon countered the move with the right handed bat of Willy Aybar. After jumping ahead 1-2, Boone left a slider over the plate and Aybar deposited it deep into the left field stands. In the blink of an eye, the Rays had turned a six run deficit into one-run lead and the Yankees seemed destined for another crushing defeat.

If Girardi was right about one thing in the previous night’s postgame, it was that the Yankees have plenty of resilience. Instead of hanging their heads, the team immediately tied the game in the top of the sixth, but did squander an opportunity to retake the lead when Austin Kearns struck out with the bases loaded. With the game now tied, the Yankees well rested bullpen was finally put to work, and, by the end of the night, it was a job well done.

After surrendering the go ahead home run to Aybar, Boone, who had not given up a run in 25 appearances dating back to July 18, recovered to retire the next four batters before handing off the baton to Chamberlain, Wood (whose use seemed to defy Girardi’s rule about resting a reliever that pitched in three of four games) and Robertson. That trio held the Rays hitless over the next three innings, thanks in large part to a fantastic diving catch by Granderson to end the ninth. So, the stage was set for another night of extra inning drama.

There were several points in the game when Jorge Posada’s bat could have been used off the bench, but leading off the 10^th inning eventually proved to be the right time. Ahead in the count 2-0, Posada sat on a fastball and crushed it deep over the batter’s eye in center field. Ultimately, however, Posada’s heroics in the top of the inning would be overshadowed by a classic baseball blunder in the bottom.

With one out and Carl Crawford on second base, Matt Joyce lifted a lazy fly ball to Greg Golson in medium-deep right. In the previous game, Golson had trouble tracking fly balls in the dome, so this time, he gingerly approached the ball, trying to make sure not to overrun it. Considering Crawford’s speed and Golson’s position, a tag to third seemed as if it would go uncontested. However, after catching the ball, Golson took one step toward third and fired a laser throw to Alex Rodriguez, who impressively fielded the short hop and slapped the tag on Crawford to end the game.

One night after Brett Gardner ended an inning getting thrown out at third on a steal attempt, it seems hard to believe that a similar mistake would be made the very next day, especially in games of such importance between quality teams. Joe Maddon and Crawford justified the decision on the grounds that it took a great throw and an extra base against Rivera has added significance, but ultimately, questionable decision making factored into the outcome for the second straight game.

Most Consecutive Games Without Surrendering a Run, Yankees Pitchers Since 1920

Source: Baseball-reference.com