The Captain's Blog

Is Jim Palmer the most overrated pitcher of all time? Disciples of defense independent pitching stats (DIPS) have often pointed to the right hander’s mediocre strikeout rate and extraordinary success on balls in play to support that claim, and the slight hasn’t gone unnoticed by Palmer. During a recent roundtable discussion convened by ESPN’s Jerry Crasnick, the three-time Cy Young award winner took on his critics with a statistic of his own.

I asked a writer I know, ‘You’re into sabermetrics. Can you look up, with a runner on third and less than two outs, did my strikeouts go up?’ And he said, ‘Yeah, they went up 17 percent.’ Well, why do you think that is? Because I didn’t want to give up a run.”

Palmer’s comment was a rebuttal to the claim that his performance was aided by luck (and the Orioles’ defensive proficiency).  At first glance, the argument sounds like an off-shoot of “pitching to the score”, but Palmer’s protest isn’t theoretical. Not only is the claim intuitively logical, but it is easily verified. So, is it true?

In order to verify Palmer’s claim, we need to establish the appropriate points of comparison. For this purpose, K/9 rates do not seem sufficient because they measure the number of strikeouts relative to outs. A more relevant comparison is between strikeouts and batters faced, but with one small adjustment. Because intentional walks have historically been four to eight times more frequent in situations with a runner on third and fewer than two outs, it makes sense to remove them from the equation. After all, the purpose of this exercise is to measure the pitcher’s intent, which, when handing out a free pass, is clearly not to record a strikeout.

MLB Rate of Intentional Walks, 1955-2016

Note: Play-by-play data is considered mostly complete from 1955 -1974, and complete from 1975 to 2016.
Source: baseball-reference.com

Before focusing on Palmer, it’s interesting to note the gradual decline in the number of intentional walks with a runner on third and fewer than two outs. With the influx of power arms and overall increase in the rate of strikeouts, this trend might suggest pitchers are more confident in their ability to get a big strikeout than, perhaps, set up a double play by putting a man on first. Has that been a successful strategy? We’ll get back to that later.

Jim Palmer’s Strikeout Rates

Note: Strikeout rates are as a percentage of batters faced, excluding intentional walks: K/(TBF-IBB).
Source: baseball-reference.com

As it turns out, Palmer’s source underestimated his ability to get the big strikeout. Net of intentional walks, Palmer’s overall strikeout rate improved from 13.8% to 17.6% when there was a runner on third with fewer than two outs, or an increase of 28%. Whether he was consciously trying or not,  the Orioles’ righty was able to get a big strikeout when he needed it most.  Now, the question becomes how rare is that ability?

MLB Strikeout Rates, 1965-2016

Note: Strikeout rates are as a percentage of batters faced, excluding intentional walks: K/(TBF-IBB).
Source: baseball-reference.com

During Palmer’s career, which spanned from 1965 to 1983, the MLB strikeout rate with a runner on third and fewer than two outs moved in lockstep with the overall figure.  In aggregate, pitchers did not exhibit an ability to get a strikeout when needed, making Palmer’s performance in that regard somewhat extraordinary. After 1983, however, the two rates began to diverge, but in an unexpected direction. In an era with more power arms, strikeouts with runners on third and fewer than two outs have increasingly declined versus the overall rate. Harking back to the graph of intentional walks, does that mean pitchers should reconsider their reluctance to hand out a free pass? Although strikeouts in these key spots are still higher probability events than ever before, there is a mild correlation between the OPS+ allowed by pitchers in the split and the size of the gap. Understanding the extent of this relationship requires a more in depth analysis, but the fact that the gap exists is, by itself, notable.

Comparing Relative Strikeout Rate (K-rate gap) to tOPS+ (runners on third and fewer than two outs)

Note: Strikeout rates are as a percentage of batters faced, excluding intentional walks: K/(TBF-IBB). Play-by-play data is considered mostly complete from 1965 -1974, and complete from 1975 to 2016. tOPS+ is the adjusted OPS allowed by all pitchers with runners on third and fewer than two outs. K-rate gap is the difference between the overall strikeout rate and the percentage runners on third and fewer than two outs.
Source: baseball-reference.com

During Palmer’s era, a pitcher was expected to go the distance, so conserving bullets was a important consideration. That’s not true today. Flush with premium velocity, the modern hurler is designed to empty the tank and hand the game off to the bullpen. Basically, today’s pitchers are always trying for a strikeout, not waiting for a key spot like Palmer. But, that doesn’t explain the lower relative strikeout rate with runners on the third and fewer than two outs. Maybe the pitcher’s intent is only half the story?

Many older baseball fans get nostalgic for the days when hitters prioritized contact. Advancing runners and opposite field singles are remembered as works of art relegated to the past by the swing-from-the-heels approach of the modern day slugger. This transition has likely played a role in the historic rise in overall strikeout rates, but may also, ironically, have shifted more control over certain outcomes to the hitter.

Think of it this way. When batters prioritized contact, the variable in the strikeout equation was the pitcher’s approach because a hitter certainly wouldn’t get more aggressive when the situation called for putting the ball in play. The opposite is true today because the constant is the pitcher’s power approach. Because you wouldn’t expect a pitcher to de-emphasize the strikeout with a runner on third and fewer than two outs, it stands to reason that the hitter is the one making an adjustment. If batters are dialing back their swings when they can knock in a run with an out, the unexpected strikeout rate gap depicted in the chart above makes more sense.

Palmer vs. MLB: Overall Strikeout Rate, 1965-1983

Note: Strikeout rates are as a percentage of batters faced, excluding intentional walks: K/(TBF-IBB).
Source: baseball-reference.com

Whether pitchers or hitters have control over certain outcomes is a chicken-and-egg type question, but what really matters are the results. And, regardless of the underlying reason, with Palmer, we know he was frequently able to record a strikeout when he most needed it. During his career, Palmer’s strikeout rate with runners on third and fewer than two outs topped the league by at least five percentage points in seven seasons, and by over 10 percentage points in five campaigns. Although Palmer’s career ended with strikeout rates well below the league average in this split, his overall comparison remained among the highest in major league history.

Palmer vs. MLB:  Strikeout Rate, Runner on 3rd with Fewer than 2 Outs, 1965-1983

Note: Strikeout rates are as a percentage of batters faced, excluding intentional walks: K/(TBF-IBB).
Source: baseball-reference.com

Although Palmer’s claim that he was able to buckle down in a tight spot is true, his relative strikeout rate doesn’t correlate with the degree to which his actual ERA exceeded his measure of fielding independent pitching (FIP). But, considering the much smaller sample size in the split (compared to all batters faced), that’s not unexpected. And yet, the veracity of the claim isn’t unimportant because it gives credibility to the notion that a pitcher’s individual response to context can influence outcomes. What’s more, it also calls into question the underlying premise of the FIP-based argument, and that, more than anything, casts doubt on the claim that Palmer was overrated because his strikeout rate was too low. After all, if a pitcher has control over contact, being able to induce a batter to put the ball in play is a strength when you have Brooks Robinson, Mark Belanger and Paul Blair standing behind you.

Pitchers with Top-10 and Bottom-10 K/(BF-IBB) Differential

Note: Includes pitchers with at least 100 batters faced in the split and 7,500 batters faced in their career. Play-by-play data is considered mostly complete from 1930 -1974, and complete from 1975 to 2016.
Source: baseball-reference.com

Palmer’s ability to increase his strikeout rate in key spots not only exceeded his contemporaries in aggregate, but also ranks among the best improvements of all time (based on seasons for which play by play data is available). Among pitchers with at least 100 batters faced in the split and 7,500 batters faced overall, Palmer ranks fifth with a 3.81 percentage point increase when a runner was on third with fewer than two outs, a rate that is particularly impressive in light of how many batters he faced.

So, is Jim Palmer the most overrated pitcher of all time? Advocates of DIPS are unlikely to be swayed by his unique ability to increase his strikeout rate when needed, but at the very least, that evidence suggests there is more to actual results than how they compare to expected outcomes. A pitcher’s intent and batter’s approach can vary based on context, and those dueling adjustments can be more advantageous for some than others.  Palmer’s rebuttal helps to illustrate that point, but ultimately, the right hander doesn’t really need to defend his peripherals. His career performance speaks for itself.