The Yankees haven’t had an active winter, but the one question they’ve reportedly been weighing is who will pitch the ninth inning next season. The choice has seemingly been narrowed down to incumbent David Robertson and lefty set-up man Andrew Miller, but what’s not as clear is the criteria the Yankees are using to make the decision. So, before venturing a guess as to whom the Bronx Bombers will tap as their next closer, let’s consider the options.
The Case for David Robertson
Since 2009, David Robertson has consistently ranked among the most effective relievers in the game. Over that span, his ERA+ of 162 ranks 12th best among all relievers with at least 250 innings, and his fWAR of 8.9 ranks fourth. Robertson is also one of only six relievers to throw at least 60 innings in each of the last five seasons. What’s more, with 39 saves last year, Robertson completed his transitioned from Mariano Rivera understudy to an effective closer in his own right. Both effective and reliable, Robertson’s level of consistency means the Yankees would be signing a known commodity, both in terms of his ability to close games and handle the pressure of New York. That’s no small consideration in a market known for rough free agent transitions. Also, though insignificant from an evaluation standpoint, Robertson’s time in the Bronx should carry some weight in terms of leadership and fan connection. Along with Brett Gardner, Robertson is the most tenured Yankee, so his presence in the clubhouse could have value to the team, while his familiarity and likeability among Yankee fans is also an added bonus. Besides, if you’re going to “overpay” a reliever, you might as well do so with one of your own.
Top-10 Relief Pitcher WAR, 2009-2014
Source: fangraphs.com
The Case for Andrew Miller
Although it’s possible the Yankees’ talent evaluators view Andrew Miller as a better pitcher than Robertson, the strongest case in favor of the lefty is based on relative cost. According to the rumor mill, Miller is seeking a four year deal worth $40 million, or approximately $10 million less than the Papelbon-esque contract being sought by Robertson. Is a $10 million savings over four years really a difference maker? Considering the Yankees’ recent efforts to lower relative payroll expense, $2.5 million per year isn’t insignificant. However, for the Yankees, the impact is much greater. Because the team is likely to continue paying a 50% luxury tax over the next four seasons, the difference in contract values is actually $16 million. Then, if you consider modest investment of the annual difference, another $1-$2 million can be tacked onto the savings. In total, the Yankees are looking at an approximately $16 million savings if they sign Miller instead of Robertson. When added to the interval value the Yankees place on the draft pick they’d net from Robertson signing elsewhere, the difference in contract costs looks more substantial.
Financial Comparison of Potential Deals for David Robertson and Andrew Miller
Note: Contract values based on “published rumors”. Investment is a 5% return on the salary difference plus luxury tax savings compounded once at the end of the year (i.e., investment begins at end of 2015 and first compounds at end of 2016).
Source: www.investor.gov (compound interest calculator)
Why Not Both?
Do the Yankees really have to choose between Robertson and Miller, or can they have their cake and eat it too? Well, that depends on the team’s main priority. If, as Brian Cashman has stated, “[the Yankees are] doing everything in [their] power to improve the club,” signing Miller and Robertson should at least be under consideration. Having two dominant relievers combine with Dellin Betances to form a shutdown bullpen is a luxury for sure, but one the Yankees can easily afford. As the chart below illustrates, the Yankees have increasingly reduced the amount of revenue spent on payroll, and, with significant revenue increases already built-in for the long term thanks to lucrative local and national TV contracts, the team’s rate of player expenditures is likely to continue lower. In other words, if the Yankees spent to recent norms, they’d have more than enough slack to absorb both Miller and Robertson, not to mention upgrades elsewhere on the roster. In the past, the Yankees have used their financial might to build seemingly redundant layers of depth, a precaution that has helped mitigate the impact of injuries and/or underperformance. A perfect example of that philosophy was the team’s signing of Rafael Soriano as a high-priced complement to Mariano Rivera, a move that eventually paid dividends when Rivera suffered a season ending injury in 2012. Should the Yankees’ use their financial largess to once again bolster the bullpen? That all depends on how badly the team’s brass wants to win in 2015.
Yankees’ Payroll/Luxury Tax as a Percentage of Team Revenue
Note: Revenue is net of revenue sharing and stadium debt service. Payroll is based on final figures for each year released by MLB, and may not necessarily equal the amount upon which the luxury tax is based. 2014 final payroll is a pro rated estimate based on opening day payroll and in-season transactions as well an allocation for player benefits.
Source: bizofbaseball.com and MLB releases published by AP (final payroll), MLB releases published by AP (luxury tax) and Forbes (revenue)
Or Neither?
Even though Miller appears to be a much cheaper option than Robertson, $40 million over four years is no small commitment for a reliever. In fact, if the team really is intent on maintaining a budget, the better alternative to signing either or both might be opting for neither. Unless the Yankees are committed to making vast improvements throughout the roster, maintaining the bullpen status quo could be a case of throwing good money after bad. Ironically, doing so seems as much a part of the Yankees’ new financial mandate as reducing relative payroll costs. After all, although Hal Steinbrenner has expressed an unwillingness to approach past spending levels, he has also made it clear that rebuilding is not an option. The result is a limbo-style approach in which the Yankees aim to both maintain the appearance of a high nominal payroll without increasing the level of investment commensurate with climbing revenues. Maintaining such a philosophy would be akin to running in place, which, for the 2015 Yankees, means another year spent 12 games off the A.L. East lead.
What Will the Yankees Do?
The Yankees’ need to keep up appearances suggests the team will sign one of the two coveted free agent closers, and, unless Robertson lowers his salary demands, the team’s penchant for cutting payroll costs means they’ll likely opt for Miller. Ultimately, whom they choose could make little difference. Both Miller and Robertson have the potential to be very effective closers over the next four years, and, as relievers, also carry the risk of being inconsistent and ineffective. What does matter, however, is the process the Yankees use to make the decision. If the Bronx Bombers continue to allow dollars to trump wins when making personnel moves, and simultaneously refuse to consider rebuilding, the franchise could remain mired in the same state of mediocrity that has defined the last two years. That’s why how the Yankees pick their next closer is more important than whom they select, and the relevance of having someone to pitch the ninth inning could be undermined by that approach.
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